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LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT-RELAnoNsHIP oF
REMEDIES UNDER TITLE I AND TITLE III-Petitioner, a local of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, established a picket
line at respondent's lumber mill and notified other locals to refuse to unload
respondent's products. Petitioner sought to force respondent to assign certain
jobs to its men. Respondent's policy had been to use its own employees
for the disputed work. As a result of petitioner's action respondent was forced
to suspend its operations. Respondent filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the NLRB alleging union violation of section 8(b)(4)(D) of the
LMRA.1 After some time the NLRB determined that petitioner's men were
not entitled to the disputed jobs and later filed a cease and desist order. 2 In
the meantime respondent brought suit in a district court under section
303(a)(4) of the LMRA. $750,000 was awarded as damages from the date
of the original picketing.8 On appeal the court of appeals affirmed the
judgment and denied petitioner's contention that the district court could

7 There seems to be no objection in the authorities to depriving other beneficiaries of
trust income m order to admit a new member to the class; it is only where divestiture of
principal -sums not m trust is required that the courts refuse to mvolve themselves m the
clliliculties of mcreasing the class. In the case of mcome from a lump sum to a class, for
example, after-born members are let m even though this diminishes the shares of mcome
going to older members. 2 SxMEs, FUTURE INTEIIESTS §387 (1936); In re Wenmoth's
Estate, 37 Ch. Div. 266 (1887).
1 The Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV, 1951) §141.
2 In the matter of International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local
No. 16, C.I.O., and Juneau Spruce Corporation, 82 N.L.R.B. 650 (1949); In the matter
of International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local No. 16, C.I.O. and
George Ford, Orville Wheat, Joe Guy and Verne Albright, as its agents and Juneau Spruce
Corporation, 90 N.L.R.B. 1753 (1950).
s Juneau Spruce Corporation v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union, (D.C. Alaska 1949) 83 F. Supp. 224.

308

MICmGAN LAW

REvmw

[ Vol. 51

not render damages covering the period of time before the union's acti.vity had
been declared illegal by the NLRB. 4 On certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The remedies under title I and title III
of the LMRA are mutually exclusive. Success under section 303(a)(4)
is not dependent upon a prior NLRB determination that an unfair labor
practice has been committed. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corporation, 342 U.S. 237, 72 S.Ct. 235 (1952).
The LMRA sets out certain unfair labor practices in section 8 of title I
and provides for enforcement upon petition before the NLRB under section
IO. Section 8(b)(4) declares it an unfair labor practice "to engage in .•. a
concerted refusal . . . to perform any services, where an object thereof is:
. . . (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to
employees in a particular labor organization . . . rather than to employees
in another labor organization. . . .''5 Under section IO(k) the NLRB hears
and determines which union is entitled to the disputed work and under
section IO(c) issues a cease and desist order. 6 Section 303 of title III declares
unlawful in virtually identical language all those unfair labor practices
listed under section 8(b)(4). This section provides that any aggrieved
person may sue in any district court for damages resulting from the commission of the unlawful acts. The full implication of the act coupled with
this decision that success under section 303 is not dependent upon a prior
administrative determination that an unfair labor practice has been committed is rather disconcerting. Unless the holding of this case is sharply
limited in the future, and there is nothing in the act or the case indicating
such limitation, certain weird results may follow. In the first place it is
clear that the language of sections 8(a)(4) and 303(a) is far from unequivocal. This means that there is room for disagreement between the NLRB
and a district court as to whether under the same fact situation a violation
has occurred. In addition, in the light of the uncertainties of proof and in
the differences of procedure before an administrative board and a court,
there is a real possibility of discrepancies in fact holdings in the same labor
dispute. Thus we may find the NLRB rendering a decision contrary to a
district court in the same case.
The debates in Congress show that the main purpose in establishing
rights and liabilities under section 303 rather than giving the NLRB jurisdiction over damage suits was to provide the aggrieved party with the
greater control over the outcome of the litigation afforded in a district court

4 International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corporation, (9th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 177.
5 The Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV, 1951) §l58(b)(4).
6 For comment on the procedure see Petro, "Job-Seeking Aggression, the NLRA, and
the Free Market,'' 50 MrcH. L. RBv. 497 (1952).
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where, for example, he may use private counsel.7 Thus it may be said that
Congress latently contemplated that a different result might follow from a
section 303 procedure than from an administrative procedure. Senator Morse
complained that certain evils might flow from the splitting of remedies
between the NLRB and the court system, but he does not appear to have
been answered in the debates, nor does it seem that Congress fully appreciated his contention.8 A somewhat comparable situation is found under the
Interstate Commerce Act. 9 Sections 8 and 9 give the right to sue for damages
resultant from violations of the act in either a district court or before the
Interstate Commerce Commission. In the Mitchell Coal case1° the Supreme
Court held that suits for .damages resulting from the charging of unreasonable
rates cannot be entertained by the district courts until the Int.erstate Commerce
Commission has determined the question of what rate is reasonable. The
Court pointed out that rate fixing requires the special skills of the Commission and also that many inconsistencies would otherwise result. However
certain language of the Interstate Commerce Act permitted the court to reach
its result within the expressed congressional intent. In the principal case the
court was faced with the plain language of Congress separating the two
remedies and redefining the rights and duties of the parties in the two titles
of the LMRA. Thus the court could not have reasonably reached a different
result. It is submitted, however, that the case brings to a focus a weakness
in the LMRA.

Wendell B. Will, S.Ed.

7 S. Rep. No. 105 on S. 1126, p. 46 et seq., 80th Cong., 1st sess. [l Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 452 et seq. (1948)]; 93 CoNG.
R:!!c. 4846 (1947) [2 Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947,
p. 1368 (1948)].
8 93 CoNG. R:!!c. 4840 (1947) [2 Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 1358 et seq. (1948)]. See also Senate Minority Report No. 105, Pt. 2
on S. 1126, p. 12 et seq. [1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, p. 474 et seq. (1948)].
924 Stat. L. 382 (1887), 49 U.S.C. (1946) §1.
10 Mitchell Coal and Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 230 U.S. 247, 33 S.Ct.
916 (1913).

